## Witnessing the Birth of a "Qualified Subdominance"?

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### What Are We Talking About?


Is anybody

(incl. the legislator)

allowed to attribute

whatever meaning

to whichever word?



### **Power and Market Power**

- Impossible to define power
- Voltaire: "dependence not inequality is a real misfortune"
- Even a powerful partner doesn't need to matter supposed the other party doesn't depend on him
  Market power (MP, *stricto sensu*) is an explicitly objective concept (related to all rivals or consumers)
  - MP(really <u>significant</u> but without this label) > <u>significant</u> MP

(yet not <u>really</u> significant in terms of competition)

MP => implies bargaining power, but bargaining power ≠ market power

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### **Bargaining Power**

- Quasidefinition of <u>bargaining power (BP)</u>: intuitive, symptomatic, tautologic
- Special treatment with <u>Buyers</u> Bargaining Power (BBP)
- Subdominant BBP more controversial than suplier's BP (food and agriculture sector extraordinarily)
- No a priori labeling thereof: double-edged weapon
- BBP (unlike MP) relates to <u>particular</u> (specific, individual) contracting suppliers  $\rightarrow$  no absolute concept
- BBP may be both boon (benefit) and menace (threat)
- <u>Countervailing buying power:</u> stimulation of competition on the supply side ↔ endangering of suppliers

### **Economic Dependence**

Economic dependence is purely <u>relative</u> concept Intuitive comprehension: <u>non</u>-existence of reasonable or sufficient <u>alternative</u> for the dependent party Economic (commercial) dependence that is

- objective and
- lasting:
- is termed "dominance" (= Market Power)

### **Economic Dependence**

- Economic dependence even without absolute form of market dominance (*partenaire obligatoire*) depends mainly on:
  - Duration of the commercial relationship
  - Specific technical equipment of the weaker partner dependent on the stronger party's activities
  - Difficulty to swiftly change the stronger partner
  - Turnover share of the dependent party achieved in the business with the stronger partner
- Economic dependence is involved with <u>abuse of MD</u> and stands for one of viewpoints of the assessment thereof

### Significant Market Power

- "<u>Significant"</u> market power: paradoxically less important than "<u>simple</u>"market power"
- Subjective or objective concept?
  - Objective one seems to prevail: buyer's potentially exploitable market position meaning generally (!) for the sellers an important distribution channel for their supplies to the consumers
    - Appplied e.g. in GB, H, LT, CZ, unlike subjectively assessed economic dependence (D, § 20/2 GWB, analogy to MD)
- Significant market power (in objective terms)  $\neq$  bargaining power, market power, buying power, economic dependence either
- SMP as a kind of <u>"qualified subdominance</u>" or "small dominant position"

### Significant Market Power and Competition

The <u>aim</u> of the concept of abuse of SMP: do we protect competitors or competition?

- Is the subdominant market power capable of endangering, distorting or excluding competition at all?
  - Czech law on SMP presupposes even <u>substantial</u> distortion of competiton (BTW, by a substantially subdominant distributor)
- Protection of a weaker <u>party</u> by public law means, as a supplement to private law ones
  - "Weakness" legally bound to the position (supplier) and/or to the branch (food and agriculture industry)

# Significant Market Power and Competition

- Strong buyers are not inevitably detrimental to consumers
- Subdominant buying power (still not reaching the threshold of dominance) may be very procompetitive
- Any successful bargaining on price means that there is still a space on the seler's side to bring down the price in favour of the <u>consumer.</u>Sellers still afraid of losing connection...
- Possible <u>bumerang-effect</u>: lowering the quality by the seller in order to avoid losses due to enforced lower price and given costs
- Quality erosion easied by private labels without reliable quality control compared to brand goods - should the AA be the quality checker?

Individual protection of small and middle-sized suppliers? OR

- Institutional protection of:
  - <u>Competition</u> among small and middle-sized suppliers?
  - <u>Competition</u> among great distributors?
  - Consumers ?

#### OR

Particular group interests?

#### OR

<u>Fairnes</u>?...<u>Freedom</u> of contract?....Or even <u>all</u> together?

- Is there an equivalent of "special responsibility" of a dominant undertaking - <u>"more special responsibility</u>" of a subdominant undertaking (yet having SMP)?
- Even more strictness to be applied to a subdominant with SMP than to a dominant?
  - So called UTT e.g. contracts in writing clumsiness and transaction cost for both parties because of easy investigation? Substantial imbalance in rights and duties assessed by AA. Other undue limitations of freedom of contract
  - Public law protection against unfair competition as an additional amplifier thereof?
- An attempt to regulate a subdominant position that is used to achieving someone's own profit to the detriment of rivals?

- Fierce competition (as a consequence of unequal bargaining power) is not fair because someone is better off?
- What's actually the difference between fierce competition and abuse of buying power ?
  - Creative destructivity of competition not welcome?
- An attempt to overbridge these inconsistences and to confess that <u>none competition</u> at all but rather <u>fairness</u> is at stake?
  - Group interests (battle on the surplus between producers and merchants (consumers) under the outdated and uprooted
     guise of competition (formerly), and under a new guise of fairness (recently)?
- Excessive egoists forced to share their egoism with new would-be egoists that were ignored so far

- Would not be prevented the competition among suppliers by means of trade terms from which consequently the consumers may be better off?
  - Czech distributor wihout MP (market share 10-12%) may be supposed to infringe competition by his conduct to a particular supplier only becasue the distributors<sup>´</sup> turnover is above 5 bil. CZK (approx. 185 bil.€)
  - Hypocracy or pretence? Simultaneous pursuing <u>contradictory goals</u> of public policy: wellness of well-lobbied farmers (and food producers respectively) and of the consumers
    - Czech AA: "public interest on fair conduct prevails over freedom of contract...."

- Special case of "public choice"?
- Genuine public policy justification rather mythical than real
- Distributive fairness imported into the commercial relation from outside because the corrective fairness created in an interaction of the parties to a private law contract does not work (factual dictate behind a contractual veil)?
- Is an administrative body like AA and the applicable administrative proceeding really best adjusted to find such a delicate balance?
- And doesn't AA deviate from its legally anchored competence (protection of competition as a public good)?

- After all, selective and discriminatory regulation on a substantially subdominant level may infringe or distort competition and consumer welfare (any of the 3 biggests distribution chains in CZ doesn't amount to 12% share in the retail food market and the joint share of 8 biggests doesn't exceed 63%. None of them has MP. Isn't it a rather nice competitive market?)
- Green Paper of the EC on Unfair Trade Practices in the <u>B2B</u> (food and non-food) Supply Chain from 31 1. 2013
- GP no legal act but at least an expression of a legal policy intention to administratively control the content of contracts beyond food- and agriculture sector and beyond market autoregulation

- Envisaged applying does not take into account "economic dependence", sector (industry) or structural limitations (not intended only for suppliers), market shares of the parties or absolute turnover figures either
  - Several unfair practices are indicated
    - e.g.retroactive misuse of unspecified, ambiguous or incomplete contract terms;
    - excessive and unpredictable transfer of costs or risks to the counterparty;
  - unfair use of confidential information;
  - unfair termination or disruption of a commercial relationship

- This attempt to safeguard the <u>fairness and proportionality</u> of commercial terms by means of <u>centrally aimed</u>, EU-wide and across-the sectors intended <u>public law</u> measures deserves criticism
- Public law means should be used in protecting <u>competition</u> and <u>consumers</u>
- The protection of generally weaker party should be accomplished by private law means

Making a mountain out of a molehill?

